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Note: Governmental Investigations of the Exercise
of First Amendment Rights: Citizens'
Rights and Remedies
I. INTRODUCTION
Congressional committees and the press have recently
exposed widespread investigations of private citizens conducted
by the federal government.' These disclosures have drawn at-
tention to the need for stricter legislative controls of governmen-
tal investigatory and data-collecting powers 2 and for effective ju-
dicial remedies for illegal governmental investigations. In the
past, citizens subjected to unconstitutional or otherwise illegal
governmental investigations have sometimes sought judicial re-
lief while the investigations were still in progress.3  The recent
1. The final report of the Senate Select Committee to Study Gov-
ernmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (the Church
committee) contained documented evidence of specific instances of the
use of illegal and improper surveillance techniques to gather information
about private citizens and subsequently used in covert actions against
those citizens. For example, the FBI employed the following tactics as
part of its COINTELPRO (Counterintelligence Program): anonymously
attacking the political beliefs of targeted citizens in order to induce their
employers to fire them; anonymously mailing letters to the spouses of
intelligence targets for the purpose of destroying their marriages; and
obtaining from the IRS tax returns of a targeted individual and then
attempting to provoke an IRS investigation for the express purpose of
deterring a protest leader from attending the Democratic National Con-
vention. Other documents disclosed efforts by the FBI to discredit Dr.
Martin Luther King as an effective civil rights leader, including mailing
Dr. King a tape recording made from microphones hidden in hotel rooms
with a threat to release the recording unless Dr. King committed suicide.
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDy GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE AcTIVITIEs, INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE
RIGHTS or AMERICANS, BOOK II, FINAL REPORT, S. REP. No. 755, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 10-12 (1976). See also Stone, The Threat to the Republic, N.Y.
REV. OF BooKs (May 27, 1976).
2. The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (Supp. V 1975), is one
response to this need. See text accompanying notes 84-85 infra.
3. See, e.g., Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965); Hentoff
v. Ichord, 318 F. Supp. 1175 (D.D.C. 1970). For cases in which the plain-
tiffs have been unsuccessful, see Sanders v. McClellan, 463 F.2d 894 (D.C.
Cir. 1972); Ansara v. Eastland, 442 F.2d 751 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Davis v.
Ichord, 442 F.2d 1207 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Cole v. McClellan, 439 F.2d 534
(D.C. Cir. 1970); Liberation News Service v. Eastland, 426 F.2d 1379 (2d
Cir. 1970); Cole v. Trustees of Columbia University, 300 F. Supp. 1026
(S.D.N.Y. 1969); Krebs v. Ashbrook, 275 F. Supp. 111 (D.D.C. 1967),
aff'd, 407 F.2d 306 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1969).
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disclosures, however, illustrate that governmental surveillance is
becoming increasingly covert, thus limiting the opportunities for
judicial relief before the investigations are completed. Post-in-
vestigation relief is therefore often sought in the form of damages
for injuries already inflicted by the investigatory process and in-
junctions to control the future adverse use of the information
gathered.4
This Note will analyze the role of the judiciary in remedying
illegal governmental investigations of exercises of first amend-
ment rights by American citizens. Essentially two issues are
raised by citizen suits for relief from such investigations. The
first is the determination of the types of governmental investi-
gations that are illegal. Consideration will be given to the extent
to which rights created by the first amendment, a constitutional
right to privacy, and certain federal statutes limit the govern-
ment's investigatory power. The second is the identification of
what, if any, judicial relief may be available. Various judicial
remedies will be examined, focusing on those provided in the
Freedom of Information Act 5 and the Privacy Act of 1974,6 the
judicial power to order expunction of records, and damages re-
coverable under the constitutional tort theory.
II. RIGHTS OF THE PRIVATE CITIZEN THAT
MAY BE VIOLATED BY GOVERNMENTAL
INVESTIGATIONS
Although governmental investigations of exercises of first
amendment rights by American citizens are not a new phenom-
4. The most recent case of this type is Paton v. La Prade, 382 F.
Supp. 1118 (D.N.J. 1974), vacated, 524 F.2d 862 (3d Cir. 1975). In 1973,
Paton was investigated by the FBI after she wrote to the Socialist Work-
ers' Party requesting political literature needed for a high school term
paper. When the FBI investigation became publicly known, Paton
brought a civil rights suit against the Director and two agents of the
FBI for declaratory and injunctive relief, damages, and expunction of
the investigatory files. The trial court ordered expunction of the files,
but granted summary judgment for defendants in the action for damages
on the ground that Paton had shown no injury. 382 F. Supp. at 1120.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed both rulings, holding
that an expunction order must be based on a "clear and complete factual
record" of the possibilities for dissemination of the records, the interests
of the government in the records, and the potential harm to the plaintiff
if the records were disseminated. Moreover, the court held that Paton's
allegations of potential harm from the records had stated a justiciable
claim for damages and other injunctive relief. 524 F.2d at 868-69.
5. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (Supp. V 1975).
6. Id. § 552a.
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enon, the federal courts have seldom squarely faced the constitu-
tional issues such investigations raise. The paucity of case law is
in part explained by the difficulty of raising a justiciable issue
prior to any injury or threat of injury caused by the investiga-
tion.7 With the recent disclosures of covert governmental inves-
tigations, however, the courts are beginning to directly confront
questions of the legality of investigations of the exercise of first
amendment rights and of the retention of records compiled dur-
ing such investigations." In resolving these issues, three possible
limitations on government powers must be considered: the first
amendment, a constitutional right to privacy, and rights created
by statute.
A. FiRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS
The first amendment 9 expressly limits government power
and has been construed as creating certain rights that cannot
be abridged absent a "compelling" state interest.' 0 In determin-
ing the constitutionality of governmental investigations of the
exercise of first amendment rights, the courts have applied a bal-
ancing approach, weighing the type of activity engaged in by the
citizen,1 the purpose of the government in conducting the inves-
tigation,12 and the effects of the investigation on the continued
7. Cf. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972); United Public Workers
v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947). The requirement of standing to sue has
been the primary barrier to review. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,
499 (1975) (the harm must not be a "'generalized grievance' shared in
substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens"); Linda
R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 (1973) (the plaintiff will have stand-
ing only if he has suffered "some threatened or actual injury resulting
from the putative illegal action"). The doctrines of ripeness, mootness,
exhaustion, and political questions may also present insuperable bars to
judicial review.
8. See note 4 supra.
9. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I. The first amendment provides:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government
for a redress of grievances.
10. See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). There the
Court stated that the "'subordinating interest of the State must be com-
pelling."' Id. at 463, quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234,
265 (1957). See also Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm.,
372 U.S. 539 (1963).
11. For cases in which participation in the Communist Party is com-
pared with participation in the more popular American political parties,
see, e.g., Galven v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954); Carlson v. Landon, 342
U.S. 524 (1952).
12. For cases in which congressional purposes in conducting investi-
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exercises of first amendment freedoms.13 The traditional first
amendment test of constitutionality is to balance the citizen's in-
terest in free speech or free association against the government's
interest in conducting investigations; 1 4 thus it is unnecessary to
differentiate between governmental actions that are invalid be-
cause they serve no legitimate state interest and those that are
invalid because they indirectly affect first amendment freedoms.
The case law may be viewed as dealing with three separate but
interrelated concerns: formulation of specific limitations on the
scope of the government's power to investigate, prevention of
"chilling" the continued exercise of first amendment rights, and
limitation of collateral effects caused by the governmental inves-
tigation. The unique nature of covert governmental investiga-
tions raises the question of whether such activities can be prop-
erly examined under a traditional first amendment analysis.
The first concern under traditional first amendment analysis,
the scope of the government's poker to investigate and regulate
first amendment activities, has led to the establishment of certain
threshold requirements for governmental action. Several cases
have involved activities of communist organizations and other
allegedly seditious groups and individuals.15 To investigate such
organizations and their members directly, the government must
first show an actual attempt at violent overthrow of the govern-
ment'6 and then must establish that any investigations comply
with the requirements of the fourth and fifth amendments. 17
Other cases have involved mandatory disclosure of political activ-
ities to investigatory agencies or congressional committees, such
as the House Un-American Activities Committee.'8 The courts
in these cases have required a showing of a compelling state in-
gations are considered, see, e.g., Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109
(1959); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
13. See, e.g., Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
In Lamont the Court was concerned with the effect of the Postal Service
and Federal Employees Salary Act of 1962, Act of Oct. 11, 1962, Pub.
L. No. 87-793, § 305 (a), 76 Stat. 840, on the "'uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open' debate and discussion that are contemplated by the First
Amendment." Id. at 307.
14. See, e.g., Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959); Wat-
kins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957); United States v. Rumely, 345
U.S. 41 (1953); American Communications Assoc. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382
(1950).
15. E.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Gibson v.
Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963).
16. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
17. See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965); Watkins v.
United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
18. McPhaul v. United States, 364 U.S. 372 (1960).
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terest as a precondition to treating the investigations as consti-
tutionally permissible.19 In DeGregory v. New Hampshire
Attorney General,20 the state threatened to investigate a citi-
zen's past subversive activities although he had denied any
connection with the Communist Party.2 1 Concluding that the
state had no valid interest in these matters,22 the United States
Supreme Court held that
the First Amendment, as well as the Fifth, stands as a barrier
to state intrusion of privacy. . . . [There must be a] showing
of "overriding and compelling state interest" that would war-
rant intrusion into the realm of political and associational pri-
vacy protected by the First Amendment. 23
Hence, past exercises of first amendment rights are protected
from later governmental investigation and disclosure just as they
are protected from direct prohibition.
The second concern expressed by the courts is that threat-
ened governmental sanctions may curtail first amendment rights.
Courts speak of the "chilling effect" of government actions on
free speech and conclude that, absent a compelling state interest,
"immediate and real injury is done to the [individual's] inter-
ests if he does not speak or act as he says he wants to."'24 A
chilling effect is typically found where the government threatens
to prosecute allegedly illegal activities that cannot be distin-
guished from constitutionally protected speech or association.2 5
But a mere allegation of an adverse effect on first amendment
rights will not be a sufficient basis on which to assert standing
to sue. In Laird v. Tatum,26 the plaintiffs challenged the legality
19. See note 10 supra.
20. 383 U.S. 825 (1966).
21. Id. at 827.
22. The basis for any investigation of DeGregory's pre-1957 activi-
ties was stale; the information being sought was historical, not current;
and the state had made no showing of having anything other than a
"remote and conjectural" interest at stake. Id. at 829-30.
23. Id. at 829.
24. National Student Assoc. v. Hershey, 412 F.2d 1103, 1111 (D.D.C.
1969). Cf. United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
25. In National Student Assoc. v. Hershey, 412 F.2d 1103 (D.D.C.
1969), members of student organizations challenged a selective service
directive that ordered exempted students engaging in "illegal" political
demonstrations to immediately be reclassified and inducted into the mili-
tary. Plaintiffs brought suit for injunctive and declaratory relief alleging
that the order "chilled" the exercise of their first amendment rights since
it was impossible to determine what standards any local board would
apply. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit agreed
with the plaintiffs' characterization of the directive and held it to be "un-
authorized and contrary to the law." Id. at 1123.
26. 408 U.S. 1 (1971).
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of the Army's program of surveillance of civilians during the war
in Vietnam, alleging that the presence of the surveillance pro-
gram had "chilled" political expression. To this argument, the
Supreme Court responded that the
alleged "chilling" effect may perhaps be seen as arising from
respondents' very perception of the system as inappropriate to
the Army's role under our form of government, or as arising
from respondents' beliefs that it is inherently dangerous for the
military to be concerned with activities in the civilian sector,
or as arising from respondents' less generalized yet speculative
apprehensiveness that the Army may at some future date mis-
use the information in some way that would cause direct harm
to respondents. Allegations of a subjective "chill" are not an
adequate substitute for a claim of specific present objective
harm or a threat of specific future harm .... 27
Yet, where the threat of harm can be objectively proved, it is
clear that the government may be enjoined from restricting first
amendment political expression indirectly. 28
The third concern expressed by the courts is the collateral
effect of government investigations. First amendment chal-
27. Id. at 13-14. In distinguishing Laird from those cases in which
a chilling effect was found, the Court said:
In none of these cases, however, did the chilling effect arise
merely from the individual's knowledge that a governmental
agency was engaged in certain activities or from the individ-
ual's concomitant fear that, armed with the fruits of those
activities, the agency might in the future take some other and
additional action detrimental to that individual. Rather, in each
of these cases, the challenged exercise of governmental power
was regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory in nature, and the
complainant was either presently or prospectively subject to
the regulations, proscriptions, or compulsions that he was chal-
lenging.
Id. at 11.
28. E.g., Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965). The
Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional section 305 (a) of the
Postal Service and Federal Employees Salary Act of 1962, 39 U.S.C. §
4008(a) (1962), and regulations promulgated thereunder which required
that an addressee of mail determined to be "communist political propa-
ganda" be provided written notice to that effect and that the addressee
specifically request receipt of such mail. The Court concluded that this
procedure violated the first amendment because of both the "affirmative
obligation" it placed on the addressees before the mail would be deliv-
ered and the manner in which it inhibited these persons from exercising
the rights of political debate and discussion. Id. at 307.
A chilling effect that is merely incidental to a valid governmental
action (one conducted for a compelling state purpose) will, however, be
constitutionally tolerated. See Anderson v. Sills, 106 N.J. Super. 545, 256
A.2d 298 (Super. Ct. 1969), rev'd, 56 N.J. 210, 265 A.2d 678 (1970). There
the court stated that "[I]f there is no intent to control the content of
speech, an overriding public need may be met even though the measure
adopted to that end operates incidentally to limit the unfettered exercise
of the First Amendment right." 56 N.J. at 226-27, 265 A.2d at 687 (Wein-
traub, C.J.).
[Vol. 60:12571262
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lenges have been raised by groups and individuals who have
feared that enforcement of certain disclosure statutes would force
them to reveal private associations and expose them to adverse
collateral actions by the government, other individuals, or both.2 9
In NAACP v. Alabama,3" the Alabama chapter of the NAACP
resisted a state statutory requirement that a membership list be
furnished to the Secretary of State before the organization could
do business in the state as a foreign corporation.3 1 The United
States Supreme Court held that the state's order to produce that
list violated the right of association of organization members.
Responding to the state's argument that it would not use the
list as a basis for harassing members of NAACP, the Court ob-
served that "[t] he crucial factor is the interplay of governmental
and private action, for it is only after the initial exertion of state
power represented by the production order that private action
takes hold."3 2 The state's production order thus violated the first
amendment not simply because of the chilling effect on member-
ship in protected political associations, but also because such dis-
closure could subject organization members to detrimental ac-
tions by private citizens, further inhibiting the continued exercise
of first amendment rights.33
The theories enunciated in this first amendment case law
can be applied to cases of covert governmental investigations.
Where an ongoing investigation is not conducted pursuant to a
compelling state interest,34 it may run afoul of the first amend-
29. E.g., Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S.
539 (1963) (disclosure of membership lists of NAACP); Talley v. Cali-
fornia, 362 U.S. 60 (1960) (disclosure of author and distributor of hand-
bills); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960) (disclosure of member-
ship lists of NAACP).
30. 357 U.S. 449 (1957).
31. In response to the action of the attorney general to enjoin it
from doing business in the state, the NAACP admitted that it had not
complied with the Alabama qualifying statute. The Alabama supreme
court twice dismissed petitions for certiorari to review contempt citations
against the NAACP. 265 Ala. 349, 91 So. 2d 214 (1956); 266 Ala. 132,
91 So. 2d 221 (1956).
32. 357 U.S. at 463.
33. The Court stressed that the NAACP as a group engaged in ad-
vocacy and depended heavily for its survival on the right of its members
to freely and confidentially associate with one another. The Court also
noted that the NAACP had made an uncontroverted showing that its
members had been exposed to public hostility on other occasions when
their identities had been exposed, thereby limiting the ability of the or-
ganization and its members to advocate their protected beliefs. Id. at
462-63. See text accompanying notes 61-64 infra.
34. At the present time, it is difficult to state with any degree of
1263
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ment if the subject citizen can objectively show that the investi-
gation limits his freedom of speech or other activities protected
by the first amendment.35 The mere fact that an investigation
is being conducted may give rise to a claim of a "chilling effect"
on the continued exercise of first amendment rights. If, how-
ever, the complaining citizen speaks or acts despite the investiga-
tion, the proper conclusion would be that there has been no chill-
ing effect and thus no violation of the first amendment. 36 Where
the existence of the investigation becomes known only after it
has been completed, no chilling effect can be found unless the
citizen can show that other investigations of the same sort will
be undertaken in the future and that the threat of future investi-
gation will curtail continued exercise of first amendment rights.37
Thus, to objectively demonstrate a present harm or threat of fu-
ture harm, as defined in Laird v. Tatum,38 more must be shown
than that the investigation simply took place.
The government's retention of investigatory files regarding
past exercises of first amendment rights compiled without a com-
pelling state interest may, however, provide a citizen a stronger
basis upon which to claim a constitutional violation.39 State ac-
tion and collateral private action together may create a chilling
effect on free speech or free association if the records compiled
during illegal investigations are subject to dissemination.4" If
the subject matter of the records is conduct or communications
protected by the first amendment, 41 disclosure of those records
certainty what sorts of governmental investigations will be found to be
constitutionally permissible. The recent disclosures of covert govern-
mental investigations have not fully revealed the nature of or motive for
the government's actions nor the scope of past investigations. Once more
facts become known, perhaps through litigation challenging the govern-
ment's conduct, it will be possible to accurately define which citizen
activities are protected by the first amendment, at least by identifying
cases in which no compelling state interest is found.
35. But see Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1971); notes 26-29 supra
and accompanying text.
36. See, e.g., Tatum v. Laird, 444 F.2d 947, 959 (D.C. Cir. 1971)(MacKinnon, J., dissenting) (quoting plaintiff's statement in the trial
record that they were "not people, obviously, who are cowed and
chilled", but were willing "to open themselves up to public investigation
and public scrutiny").
37. In such a situation, this threat of future investigation would be
the sole basis for a claim of a chilling effect. Of course, the objectivity
requirement of Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1971), would still have to
be met by potential plaintiffs. See note 7 supra.
38. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1971).
39. See notes 68-77 infra and accompanying text.
40. See note 33 supra.
41. Although the right to petition the government is protected by
the first amendment, see note 9 supra, it would appear that the govern-
1264 [Vol. 60:1257
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may curtail constitutional rights just as effectively as actual or
threatened sanctions against the activities that were investi-
gated.42  In such a case, the citizen could argue that retention
of the records generated by covert governmental activities must
be prohibited because the investigation and resulting records
exceed the permissible scope of the government's constitutional
powers.43 The courts could grant relief under this argument ei-
ther by limiting the government's power to investigate or by
holding adverse collateral actions impermissible.4 4
B. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY
The Constitution does not expressly provide a specific right
to privacy. The United States Supreme Court, however, has re-
ferred to various constitutional provisions as protecting the in-
dividual's right of privacy,4 5 though it has not yet explicitly iden-
tified the single source of such a right.4 6 Rather, the Court has
spoken of the right to privacy only in a few narrowly defined
and unrelated fact situations.47  These protections are invoked
ment is not barred from recording such petitions. Thus, if these records
are distributed by the government there would not be any first amend-
ment claim, since such distribution would amount to no more than repe-
tition of the previously made public statements of the citizen. Although
there is no relevant case law, a first amendment claim might lie if the
government misuses such records to curtail a continued exercise of first
amendment rights.
42. This would appear to hold true only where the citizen's activi-
ties investigated are not in the nature of a petition to the government.
Again, it is necessary to show that the government will release the rec-
ords and that the release will have a chilling effect.
43. Cf. discussion of DeGregory v. New Hampshire Attorney Gen-
eral in text accompanying notes 20-23 supra.
44. Although this conclusion can be reached based on existing
precedent, no court has yet so held. When retention of the records is
claimed to violate the first amendment, the issues become very much
like those involved in the development of a constitutional right to pri-
vacy. See notes 65-75 infra and accompanying text.
45. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (the concept of ordered liberty
guaranteed by the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (first amendment); Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (fourth amendment); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (penumbras emanating from the first
eight amendments); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (first
amendment); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957) (first amend-
ment).
46. Rather, the Court "has recognized that a right of personal pri-
vacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under
the Constitution." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
47. Compare Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (woman's right to
have an abortion) with Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (exclu-
sion of evidence obtained by listening device outside public phone
booth).
19761 1265
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most often in cases involving searches and seizures under the
fourth amendment.48  Yet various other forms of governmental
investigations and restraints on personal liberty have also been
held to violate the constitutional right to freedom from unwar-
ranted governmental intrusion.49 Commentators have observed
that the constitutional right to privacy encompasses both an indi-
vidual's right to be free from compelled disclosure of constitu-
tionally protected activities and his right to remain autono-
mous. 50
In certain cases, then, the Supreme Court has recognized a
general right of privacy that extends beyond protection from
governmental investigation to protection for personal autonomy.
The Court has referred to the penumbral protections of the first
eight amendments, 51 the ninth amendment, 52 and the concept
of fundamental liberty guaranteed by the first section of the
fourteenth amendment53 as the constitutional bases for the pri-
vacy right. In Griswold v. Connecticut,"4 the Supreme Court de-
clared unconstitutional state statutes prohibiting the use and pre-
scription of contraceptives insofar as those statutes applied to
married couples. Although the Court was divided on identifying
the appropriate constitutional theory underlying the privacy
right,55 Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, relied on a penum-
bral theory, asserting that the specific guarantees of the first
eight amendments also protect peripheral rights.5 Viewing
these specific guarantees as an integrated whole, Justice Douglas
concluded that they create "zones of privacy" into which a state
may not intrude.57 The source of the right to personal autonomy
48. E.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Silverman v.
United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438 (1928).
49. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (court-ordered
wiretapping); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (court-ordered
production of personal papers).
50. See Project, Government Information and the Rights of Citizens,
73 MicH. L. REV. 971, 1282-97 (1975).
51. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
52. Id. at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
53. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
54. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
55. Justice Harlan considered the right of privacy to be protected
by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment since it was "'im-
plicit in the concept of ordered liberty.'" 381 U.S. at 500. Justice Gold-
berg relied on the ninth amendment, arguing that the first eight amend-
ments were not to be considered exhaustive. Id. at 492.
56. Id. at 483-85.
57. Id. at 484.
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was differently identified in Roe v. Wade,55 where the Court held
that a woman has an absolute right to an abortion during the
first trimester of pregnancy. Relying on a fundamental rights
approach, the Court agreed that the fourteenth amendment's con-
cept of personal liberty and restrictions on state action combined
with the ninth amendment is broad enough to encompass a wom-
an's choice of whether to have an abortion.59
The first amendment itself has also been treated as a source
of a specific constitutional right to privacy. In these cases,
however, the Supreme Court has not relied on the concept of
personal autonomy, but has instead created a limitation on gov-
ernmental power to affect those activities of citizens that are
deemed to merit constitutional protection.6 0 Thus, in NAACP
v. Alabama,"' the associational right of NAACP members was ac-
corded constitutional protection and the state could not force dis-
closure of membership lists. Similarly, in DeGregory v. New
Hampshire Attorney General, 2 past associations that were placed
by statute beyond the reach of a legitimate state investigation
were held constitutionally immune from compelled disclosure.63
In both cases the right to privacy was considered independently
of the possible "chilling effect" that disclosure might have had
on continued exercise of first amendment rights. Thus, the
Court has established an independent constitutional right to free-
dom from compelled disclosure of otherwise protected activities.6 4
The proper approach to analyzing the constitutional right to
privacy in the context of the exercise of first amendment rights
is to examine permissible governmental actions, rather than to
58. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
59. The Court held that the "right of privacy, whether it be founded
in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restric-
tions upon state actions, as we feel it is, or, as the district court deter-
mined, in the Ninth Amendment's reservations of rights to the people,
is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to
terminate her pregnancy." Id. at 153.
60. See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); NAACP v.
Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178
(1957).
61. 357 U.S. 449 (1958). See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
62. 383 U.S. 825 (1966). See notes 20-22 supra and accompanying
text.
63. DeGregory also comports with those cases from the 1950's in
which the Court refused to support compelled testimony before the
House Un-American Activities Committee. See, e.g., Barenblatt v.
United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959); Uphous v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959).
64. See Project, Government Information and the Rights of Citizens,
73 MIcH. L. Rlv. 971, 1288 (1975).
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determine whether a direct right that stands as a barrier to gov-
ernmental action65 has been conferred on the citizen. From this
perspective, the right to privacy in the first amendment context
is more akin to the fourth amendment's restrictions on searches
and seizures than to a specifically expressed guarantee, such as
the thirteenth amendment guarantee of freedom from involun-
tary servitude.66 Where the courts have formulated restrictions
on governmental action, they have occasionally required a com-
pelling state interest before the government may act. This is
what the courts have done with the first amendment. 67 And
where a compelling state interest is found to exist, the govern-
ment may intrude only so far as is reasonably necessary to fulfill
its legitimate goals.6s An ascertained limit on the scope of
permissible governmental actions, then, also defines the resultant
rights of citizens, including a right to privacy from certain
types of governmental actions. Although this "permissible gov-
ernmental actions" approach does not incorporate the "funda-
mental rights" theory,69 it is consistent with the manner in which
the courts have dealt with the majority of claims to a right to
privacy. Consequently, the approach affects only the types of
judicially enforceable remedies available,70 not whether a remedy
will in fact be afforded.
To develop the definition of a constitutional right to pri-
vacy fully, restrictions on governmental action must be related to
basic constitutional concepts of the proper function of govern-
ment. Under the first amendment, it has been urged that free
speech is necessary to foster communication among citizens and
the application of information gained thereby to decisions of self-
governance.7 ' The focus is on separating the individual from
65. Since the first eight amendments of the Bill of Rights are
phrased in terms of restrictions or prohibitions on governmental action,
this approach appears more consonant with constitutional language.
Often, the concern will not be whether a citizen's particular right has
been infringed, but rather whether the action taken by the government
is within the scope of its constitutional powers. By focusing on restric-
tions on governmental action, this analysis gives less weight to the spe-
cific injury suffered by the complaining citizen. Even so, the case or
controversy requirements of Article III still must be met by a claim
of personal harm or injury resulting from the government's impermissi-
ble actions. See text accompanying note 26 supra.
66. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
67. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
68. Id. at 154-56.
69. See notes 45-46 supra.
70. See note 65 supra.
71. See text accompanying notes 58-59 supra.
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governmental influence in personal matters that are so constitu-
tionally favored that no governmental intrusion is permis-
sible.7 2  Using an analysis similar to that in Roe v. Wade,7s
this theory could be said to create an area of personal autonomy.
But since the courts also speak of the exception under the first
amendment for compelling state interests,74 it is more consistent
to view a first amendment-based right of privacy as the conse-
quence of a restriction on governmental action. Thus, the "per-
missible governmental actions" approach should be viewed as the
model for the right to privacy,75 leading to the conclusion that
the right exists in all areas in which the government may not
permissibly act.
C. STATUTORY RIGHTS
Statutes that regulate governmental surveillance and record-
keeping and statutes that define the powers of certain govern-
ment agencies constitute a third source of rights that may be
invoked by a citizen who has been subjected to an illegal govern-
mental investigation. Statutory rights are expressly created by
the Freedom of Information Act,76 which confers a broad right of
access to government files, and by the Privacy Act of 1974,77
which limits the scope of governmental investigations and grants
some degree of control to citizens over dissemination of certain
types of investigatory files. Indirect statutory rights include
limitations on investigations by governmental agencies, 7 1 certain
provisions of the Privacy Act of 1974 regulating the permissible
subject matter and methods of acquisition of records,79 and
numerous other specific regulatory statutes.80 Thus, the first
group of statutes directly confers a right that may be relied on
72. See also DeGregory v. New Hampshire Attorney General, 383
U.S. 825 (1966); text accompanying notes 20-23 supra.
73. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
74. See note 10 supra.
75. The fourth amendment is consistent with this analysis, through
its requirement of reasonableness, although it does not as readily demon-
strate the judicial balancing of competing interests that must take place
under the first amendment.
76. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (Supp. V 1975).
77. Id. § 552a.
78. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (1970). The section authorizes the
Attorney General or his designee (which includes members of the FBI)
to obtain court orders for wiretapping, but only on application to a fed-
eral judge and only with respect to certain enumerated offenses.
79. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e) (Supp. V 1975).
80. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1702 (1970) (dealing with obstruction of
the mails), cited in Paton v. LaPrade, 524 F.2d 862, 869 (3rd Cir. 1975).
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in seeking a remedy,8' while the second group creates a zone of
protection within which the citizen may be included.8 2 Reliance
on either group of statutory rights simplifies the necessity of
establishing the violation of a vested right and avoids difficult
constitutional issues.83
The Privacy Act of 1974 is the most significant of -the protec-
tive statutes. The Act directly limits the government's power
to collect records on the exercise of first amendment rights by
providing that no agency may gather information "describing
how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the First
Amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or ... unless
pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforce-
ment activity .... "84 The citizen who challenges a governmen-
tal investigation need only prove that the action was beyond the
legitimate grant of authority to the particular agency. Even
though the Privacy Act of 1974 provides limited remedies for vio-
lations of the above section, 85 it can be argued that the section
creates rights which extend beyond the specific limitations on
government action.
III. REMEDIES FOR COVERT GOVERNMENTAL
INVESTIGATIONS THAT VIOLATE
CIVIL RIGHTS
Before seeking judicial relief from a covert governmental
investigation it is necessary to determine whether an investiga-
tion has been conducted, whether investigatory records still exist,
and whether a constitutional or statutory right has been violated.
At least four methods are presently available to resolve these
questions: access -to the records under the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act86 and the Privacy Act of 1974;87 expunction of the inves-
tigatory records; declaratory and injunctive relief; and a damages
action under the Bivens constitutional tort theory.
81. See, e.g., Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (Supp. V 1975).
See also text accompanying notes 104-107 infra.
82. See note 80 supra. Cf. Association of Data Processing Serv.
Org., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
83. Although the initial burden on the plaintiff is lessened by such
an approach, there is no indication of greater final success, except with
statutes, such as the Privacy Act of 1974, which have very specific re-
medial provisions.
84. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e) (7) (Supp. V 1975).
85. See notes 176-81 infra and accompanying text.
86. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (Supp. 1975).
87. Id. § 552a.
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A. AcCESS TO THE INVESTIGATORY REcoRDs
Absent the fortuitous discovery of investigatory records
concerning a private citizen, the first step in the remedial process
is to determine the existence of records through use of the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).8s The request procedures
of the FOIA provide a means for determining the existence of
investigatory records, even though in some cases actual access
to the files cannot be gained. Whether a right of access exists
turns on the applicability of recently amended exemption 7 of
the FOIA,s9 which provides that disclosure is not required for
materials that are "investigatory records compiled for law en-
forcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production
of such records would (A) interfere with enforcement proceed-
ings .... ,,"0 The FOIA expressly requires a court to decide
whether exemption 7 applies to protect the material from dis-
closure under the Act. The specificity of the requirement en-
sures that the governmental agency claiming the exemption has
the burden of demonstrating which enumerated interest would
be harmed by disclosure.91
88. Id. § 552(a) (3).
89. Id. § 552(b) (7). Congress amended exemption seven in 1974 to
"clarify congressional intent disapproving certain court interpretations
which have tended to expand the scope of agency authority to withhold
certain 'investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes.'"
H.R. REP. No. 1380, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. at 12 (1974). See also Bristol
Myers v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824
(1970). Compare Weisberg v. Department of Justice, 489 F.2d 1195 (D.C.
Cir. 1973). See also Note, The Investigatory Files Exemption to the
FOIA: The D.C. Circuit Abandons Bristol-Meyers, 42 GEo. WASH. L. REV.
869 (1974); Note, Investigatory Files Exemption Remains Operative Af-
ter Investigation and Law Enforcement Proceedings Concluded, 57 TUL.
L. REV. 1137 (1973).
90. (B) deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial
adjudication, (C) constitute an unwarranted invasion of per-
sonal privacy, (D) disclose the identity of a confidential source
and, in the case of a record compiled by a criminal law enforce-
ment authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by
an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence
investigation, confidential information furnished only by the
confidential source, (E) disclose investigative techniques and
procedures, or (F) endanger the life or physical safety of law
enforcement personnel; ....
5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (7) (Supp. V 1975).
91. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. v. I.T.O. Corp. of Baltimore, 508
F.2d 945 (4th Cir. 1974); Washington Research Project, Inc. v. Department
of HEW, 504 F.2d 238 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975);
Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973). To achieve these results,
the 1974 Amendments authorize a court to inspect the records in camera
to determine whether an exemption should be granted. 5 U.S.C. § 552
(a) (4) (B) (Supp. V 1975). See also Ash Grove Cement Co. v. FTC, 511
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Exemption 7 is crucial in determining whether the FOIA will
operate to compel disclosure. Several problems exist in applying
the exemption, however, including the resolution of whether the
records are in fact "investigatory records compiled for law
enforcement purposes," whether disclosure will "interfere with
enforcement proceedings," and whether governmental illegality
in record compilation will affect the exemption.
The first problem concerns the phrase "investigatory rec-
ords" contained in exemption 7. The Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit in Bristol-Meyers v. FTC,92 recog-
nizing that the title given to specific records cannot be treated as
indicative of their actual contents, stated that an "agency cannot,
consistent with the broad disclosure mandate of the Act, protect
all its files with the label 'investigatory.' "9 The FOIA now
expressly permits in camera review to verify government conten-
tions relating to the character of the records. 94 To meet its bur-
den, the government must show that the contents of the records
are actually investigatory in nature and not simply data collected
for some purpose other than law enforcement. 95
The statutory language, "compiled for law enforcement
purposes," is the source of the second major problem in applying
the exemption. In the past, courts have had difficulty in deter-
mining when such a purpose is present. Some courts have fo-
cused on the government's intent at the time the investigation
was conducted in order to ascertain whether law enforcement
was a significant aspect;96 others have stressed preventing pre-
F.2d 815 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (error by trial court not to inspect in camera
when the government's affidavit was too conclusory and thus legally in-
sufficient). Courts are also authorized to inspect in camera to sever dis-
closable information from exempt information contained within the same
files. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (a) (4) (B) (Supp. V 1975). Thus, the present lan-
guage of the exemption in § 7 solves some of the many major problems
that formerly led to inconsistent results among the courts. See Note, In-
vestigatory Files Exemption Remains Operative After Investigation and
Law Enforcement Proceedings Concluded, 47 TuL. L. Rnv. 1137 (1973).
92. 424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1975).
93. 424 F.2d at 939. See also Aspin v. Department of Defense, 491
F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1973). There the court stated that to "prevent the
unauthorized use of a § 7 exemption by agencies as a shield against
disclosure, there must be some method of assuring that the exemption
is being properly invoked." Id. at 29.
94. See note 91 supra.
95. See, e.g., Center for Nat'l Policy Review on Race and Urban Is-
sues v. Weinberger, 502 F.2d 370, 373 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
96. See, e.g., Rural Housing Alliance v. Department of Agriculture,
,490 F.2d 79 (1973), reh. denied, 502 F.2d 1179 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (considera-
tion whether purpose of the records was to determine if an enforcement
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mature disclosures of an enforcement action.9 7 The District of
Columbia Circuit has stated perhaps the most reasonable con-
struction of this exemption 7 language:
For a file to be deemed to have been compiled for law
enforcement purposes it is not necessary that. an adjudication
have been imminent or even likely . . . at the time the mate-
rial was amassed .... [Yet] where the inquiry departs from
the routine and focuses with special intensity upon a particular
party, an investigation is under way.98
The third major problem with exemption 7 concerns the
showing that the government must make to come within the
terms of the specific requirements exempting law enforcement
records from disclosure. The statutory language barring inter-
ference with enforcement proceedings9 9 has presented the great-
est difficulty. Judicial disagreement over the assessment of the
likelihood of future prosecutions °0 was resolved by the 1974
amendments to exemption 7. The Amendments now place the I
burden on the government to factually demonstrate that a prose-
cution is about to occur or that some other legitimate law en-
forcement interest will be harmed by disclosure. 10 1 Arguably,
this statutory change compels the government to present a court
with objective proof that the stated grounds for exemption ac-
tually involve an enforcement proceeding or an investigation that
has a justifiable legal basis.
The exemption 7 barriers to disclosure of governmental
records thus should not prevent disclosure where the records
were illegally compiled and retained. In camera inspection of
action should be brought); Weisberg v. Department of Justice, 489 F.2d
1195 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (crucial consideration held to be the circumstances
under which files were compiled).
97. See, e.g., Bristol-Myers v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1975).
98. Center for Nat'l Policy Review on Race and Urban Issues v.
Weinberger, 502 F.2d 370, 373 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Courts have variously
stated the same test, but in all cases the inquiry is (1) whether the origi-
nal purpose was for law enforcement and (2) whether the records con-
tain information relevant to that purpose.
99. See note 90 supra and accompanying text.
100. Compare Bristol-Myers v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970); Black v. Sheraton Corp., 371 F. Supp.
97 (D.D.C. 1974); Stern v. Richardson, 367 F. Supp. 1316 (D.D.C. 1973);
Legal Aid Soc'y v. Shultz, 349 F. Supp. 771 (N.D. Cal 1972); Philadelphia
Newspapers, Inc. v. HUD, 343 F. Supp. 1176 (E.D. Pa. 1972); M.A.
Shapiro & Co. v. SEC, 339 F. Supp. 467 (D.D.C. 1972); Cooney v. Sun
Shipbldg. & Drydock Co., 288 F. Supp. 708 (E.D. Pa. 1968) with Frankel
v. SEC, 460 F.2d 813 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 889 (1972).
101. See note 89 supra. See also Wellford v. Hardin, 444 F.2d 21
(4th Cir. 1971).
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the records may reveal that the files are not "investigatory
records compiled for law enforcement purposes," but instead are
the product of an unconstitutional or otherwise illegal investiga-
tion.10 2 Where the investigation involved protected first amend-
ment activities, disclosure will not "interfere with enforcement
proceedings," since no enforcement action may be based on those
activities.10 3  In the vast majority of cases, these arguments
should suffice to rebut a claim of exemption from disclosure
under the FOIA.
The Privacy Act of 1974104 also provides for access to inves-
tigatory records compiled on individuals. Virtually all records
compiled for criminal law enforcement purposes, however, are
beyond citizen access; 105 and unlike the FOIA, the Privacy
Act does not require the government to demonstrate with specif-
icity that access to the records would harm its law enforcement
interests. 0 6 Therefore, it is more difficult for citizens to gain
access to records under the Privacy Act than under the FOIA
when an exemption is claimed by the government. Nevertheless,
a citizen may invoke the Privacy Act by arguing that the govern-
102. It may become necessary for a citizen to prove that the speech
or conduct investigated, or which served as the basis for the investiga-
tion, was constitutionally protected. If this was not clearly the case,
the citizen seeking access to the records will have to litigate the first
amendment issue to argue that the exemption in § 7 does not apply. See
notes 9-33 supra and accompanying text. While the evidence supporting
this contention will remain in the control of the court, the FOIA provi-
sions permitting in camera inspection can aid in making certain that the
government has a foundation for its claim of exemption.
103. When such a claim is presented, the court must necessarily view
the factors that have traditionally been used in determining whether the
first amendment protects the subject conduct. If the court concludes that
the citizen was engaged in protected conduct, then it generally will fol-
low that no prosecution of the citizen can be undertaken. Often, the con-
tents of the records themselves may demonstrate that the subject matter
of the investigation does not involve illegal activity.
104. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (Supp. V 1975).
105. The Privacy Act specifically exempts from disclosure:
(A) information compiled for the purpose of identifying indi-
vidual criminal offenders and alleged offenders and consisting
only of identifying data and notations of arrests, the nature and
disposition of criminal charges, sentencing, confinement, release,
and parole and probation status; (B) information compiled for
the purpose of a criminal investigation, including reports of in-
formants and investigators, and associated with an identifiable
individual; or (C) reports identifiable to an individual compiled
at any stage of the process of enforcement of the criminal laws
from arrest or indictment through release from supervision.
Id. § 552a(j) (2).
106. Compare note 105 supra with note 90 supra and accompanying
text.
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ment is not entitled to an exemption since the records in fact
are not "information compiled for the purpose of a criminal
investigation."'1 7 Any possible conflict between the standards
of the Privacy Act and the FOIA should be resolved by allowing
the narrower language of the latter's exemption 7 to control,
thereby making disclosure more readily available.
B. EXPUNCTION OF THE INVESTIGATORY RECORDS
Court-ordered expunction of investigatory records consti-
tutes the most important remedy for the citizen subjected to an
illegal governmental investigation. That remedy may have the
effect of permanently precluding the government from using the
fruits of its illegal inquiry. Although a request for expunction
generally accompanies a request for declaratory or injunctive
relief, 0 8 an expunction demand may be the only relief sought.
When invoking their broad equitable powers to order expunc-
tion, 10 courts normally balance the relative interests of the par-
ties. °10 Standing to sue seldom presents a problem since a
showing of possible future use or dissemination of the records
has been treated as an immediate threat of injury."' Simi-
larly, the courts almost always assume that expunction requests
are otherwise justiciable." 2  Since these requests most often
occur in the context of arrest records," 8 the analysis of expunc-
tion of investigatory records must be based on those cases.
107. The same analysis and requirements as to exemption seven of
the FOIA would appear to apply. See notes 92-103 supra and accom-
panying text.
108. See, e.g., Herschel v. Dyra, 365 F.2d 17 (7th Cir. 1966); Bilick
v. Dudley, 356 F. Supp. 945 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
109. Chastain v. Kelley, 510 F.2d 1232 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Menard v.
Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Sullivan v. Murphy, 478 F.2d 938
(D.C. Cir. 1973); United States ex rel. James v. Rundle, 358 F. Supp.
939 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
110. See, e.g., Morrow v. District of Columbia, 417 F.2d 728 (D.C.
Cir. 1969); Kowall v. United States, 53 F.R.D. 211 (W.D. Mich. 1971).
111. See, e.g., Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Sul-
livan v. Murphy, 478 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Kowall v. United States,
53 F.R.D. 211 (W.D. Mich. 1971).
112. Note, The FBI Has An Affirmative Duty to Ensure the Accuracy
of the Information Contained in its Criminal Files, 53 TEx. L. REv. 1308,
1309-10, n.8 (1975) [hereinafter cited as FBI Has An Affirmative Duty].
113. See also Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955) (disloyalty rec-
ords); Finley v. Hampton, 473 F.2d 180 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (HUD employ-
ee's records); Newell v. Ignatius, 407 F.2d 715 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (Navy
records); Parducci v. Rutland, 316 F. Supp. 352 (M.D. Ala. 1970) (teacher
suspension and dismissal records).
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Initially, it must be noted that since the expunction is equi-
table in nature, no absolute right to relief exists even if govern-
mental illegality can be proved.114 Preservation of illegally com-
piled records appears to be proper only when the government's
interests in those records, based on some continuing need for the
information, outweighs the potential harm to the plaintiff's repu-
tation or economic future.115 On the other hand, courts have
generally ordered total expunction of records of an illegal arrest
when the plaintiff demonstrates the likelihood of serious future
harm if the records are disseminated. 1 6 Thus, requests for ex-
punction of investigatory records must be accompanied by proof
that the records are subject to dissemination." 7 In the arrest
records situation, a plaintiff need not demonstrate the exact con-
sequences that may result from the maintenance of a criminal
file," 8 but only that the records will be provided upon request
to other governmental agencies, to potential employers, or to an
adverse party in litigation." 9
114. Sullivan v. Murphy, 478 F.2d 938, 970 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
It may be, however, that measures short of physically de-
stroying the records in question will prove adequate to assure
complete and effective relief. For example, an order placing
the original documents under seal and prohibiting disclosure
of their contents, except upon further order of the District
Court predicated on a showing of good cause, may provide a
rerhedy reasonably equivalent to expungement in terms of pro-
tection of plaintiff's rights. The balance of government inter-
ests may warrant different treatment for different ... records
Id. at 973.
115. See, e.g., Finley v. Hampton, 473 F.2d 180 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
116. See, e.g., Bilick v. Dudley, 356 F. Supp. 945 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
117. Morrow v. District of Columbia, 417 F.2d 728 (D.C. Cir. 1969);
Finley v. Hampton, 473 F.2d 180 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
118. Although [plaintiff] cannot point with mathematical cer-
tainty to the exact consequences of his criminal file, we think it
clear that he has alleged a "cognizable legal injury" . . . This
court, like other courts, held that unlawful maintenance of
records of arrests results in "injuries and dangers" that are
"plain enough" . . . and that "this threat is not dissipated, or
rendered insubstantial or illusory, by the fact that arrest was
not followed by a prosecution" ....
Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017, 1023 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Courts easily
reach this conclusion concerning arrest records because the FBI has es-
tablished procedures for retaining and disseminating records of all ar-
rests referred to its resources. Tarlton v. Saxbe, 507 F.2d 1116 (D.C. Cir.
1974).
119. See, e.g., Kowall v. United States, 53 F.R.D. 211 (W.D. Mich.
1971):
Information denominated [in] a record of arrest ... may sub-ject an individual to serious difficulties. Even if no direct
economic loss in involved, the injury to an individual's reputa-
tion may be substantial. Economic losses themselves may be
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Records of illegal governmental investigations of the exer-
cise of first amendment rights present more difficult problems.
If the investigation was conducted by an investigatory agency,
such as the FBI or IRS, then the usual record-keeping and
dissemination processes will be sufficient to establish that a
danger exists in continued retention of the records.120  If the
investigation was conducted covertly or outside of the normal
agency procedures, however, there may be little opportunity to
discover the full extent of potential dissemination, even by means
of the FOIA or the Privacy Act of 1974.121 In such a case, the
government should be required to show exactly what use has
been made of the records, where and how they have been stored,
and what sort of dissemination may occur.122
If some risk of dissemination is established by the citizen,
a balance must be struck between the competing interests of the
government and the individual. Courts recognize a government
both direct and serious. Opportunities for schooling, employ-
ment, or professional licenses may be restricted or nonexistent as
a consequence of the mere fact of an arrest, even if followed by
acquittal or complete exoneration of the charges involved.
Id. at 214-15. In major metropolitan areas, distribution of arrest records
upon request by other police departments, branches of the same govern-
ment or private citizens is a matter of course. For a synopsis of a re-
port concerning the effects of arrest records in the District of Columbia,
see Morrow v. District of Columbia, 417 F.2d 728 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Simi-
lar studies have been conducted in other metropolitan areas of the
country. See, e.g., Note, The Arrest Record and New York City Hiring;
An Evaluation, 9 COLUM. J. LAW & SOC. PROBLEMS 442 (1943).
120. The difficulties with demonstrating possible dissemination of
such investigatory records arise from the fact that it is not generally
known what use the government makes of the records. It seems reason-
able to expect that dossiers are exchanged among the agencies of the
federal government. But presently it is almost impossible to determine
if these records are also disseminated to state governments or the private
sector. Because of the covertness involved with regard to these investi-
gatory records, once a request for expunction has been made by the citi-
zen, the burden should be placed on the government to affirmatively
show that the records will not be utilized in any manner adverse to the
citizen.
In Paton v. LaPrade, 524 F.2d 862 (3d Cir. 1975), discussed in note
4 supra, the court found that a general allegation of the possibility of
dissemination sufficed to establish Paton's standing to request an ex-
punction order, although it remanded to the district court for further de-
termination of the propriety of an order. Absent a government rebuttal
to a claim of probable dissemination, the courts should simply assume
that dissemination is certain to occur in the future.
121. If there originally existed the motive to conduct a covert and
illegal investigation, that same motive may include keeping the records
hidden from any judicially enforced attempts at discovery.
122. See note 120 supra.
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interest in retaining arrest records to facilitate criminal investi-
gations, to bring formal charges against an individual, and to im-
peach witnesses at trial.12 3 In Morrow v. District of Columbia,1 2
4
the elements of the government's interest were expanded:
The inquiry might better be directed to the question:
what valid law enforcement purposes are served by retaining
and disseminating to law enforcement agencies the arrest
record in a particular case? Thus the focus would include the
reasons for the dismissal or other disposition of the case (if
dismissed on a technicality there might be better reason to
keep the records intact than if dismissed for lack of evidence;
further in the rare case of a malicious prosecution there seems
no valid reason for maintaining the records). Another focus
would be the nature of the crime; some types of crimes may
follow a pattern, in which case it would be more reasonable to
retain a record of who has been repeatedly arrested in a cer-
tain area for such a crime.12 5
The government may attempt to justify the retention of
records compiled in the course of investigations of exercises
of first amendment rights by reliance on factors such as these.
Against -these factors, however, must be balanced the reasoning
of some courts that no colorable claim of a valid public interest
arises in preserving records of illegal arrests. 126 These courts
maintain that an invalid arrest vitiates any right to retain the
resulting records. 127 Such a conclusion is appealing though not
persuasive. Many illegal contacts with citizens produce valuable
information and there may be a strong governmental interest in
retaining the record of that contact. 28  Nevertheless, since ille-
gally obtained information is inadmissible in court in any subse-
quent prosecution, 29 illegally obtained investigatory and arrest
123. Cf. Kowall v. United States, 53 F.P.D. 211, 214-16 (W.D. Mich.
1971).
124. 417 F.2d 728 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
125. Id. at 743.
126. See, e.g., Wheeler v. Goodman, 306 F. Supp. 58 (W.D.N.C. 1969),
vacated and remanded on other grounds, 401 U.S. 987 (1971). In that
case the district court concluded:
Arrest records exist to facilitate criminal investigation, but the
plaintiffs' records here perform no such function. Plaintiffs
have committed no crimes, and retention of their arrest records
cannot be justified as "criminal identification."
306 F. Supp. at 65. See also United States v. Kalish, 271 F. Supp. 968,
970 (D.P.R. 1967).
127. Hughes v. Rizzo, 282 F. Supp. 881 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
128. See Morrow v. District of Columbia, 417 F.2d 728, 743 (D.C. Cir.
1969). The worth of investigatory records cannot be measured solely
by their admissibility in court, since in at least some cases illegal con-
tacts with the public may lead to information that will be admissible
in a prosecution.
129. Such information, however, may be used for impeachment pur-
poses. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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records should be treated as having no practical value to the gov-
ernment 130 and hence need not be protected when they almost
certainly will harm the subject citizen.
The interests of the private citizen in expunction must also
be considered in applying the balancing test. The citizen's pri-
mary concern with arrest records is "the adverse effect on job
opportunity."' 3' A refinement of that problem that has been
noted by the courts is that "employers cannot or will not distin-
guish between arrests resulting in convictions and arrests which
do not."'1 32 A further concern has been the damage to a citizen's
reputation if arrest records are disseminated, causing collateral
social and economic consequences. 33 Thus, when a prosecution
is dismissed for lack of a chargeable offense, the courts have
deemed expunction necessary to give full effect to that dis-
missal.'134 Expunction has also been viewed as an attempt to re-
store those legal rights that existed prior to illegal action by the
government. 35 Some courts have even expressed concern over
the invasion of privacy resulting from broad dissemination of
legal arrest records and have ordered expunction when no strong
governmental interest in retaining possession of the records has
been shown. 30 The concerns over individual interests in the
context of arrest records should apply even more strongly to rec-
ords of illegal governmental investigations of the exercise of first
amendment rights. Where these records are subject to dissemi-
nation, there are grave risks to personal reputation and privacy.
Since few potential employers or other persons can distinguish
between valid and invalid investigations, 37 the protections af-
forded by expunction should be accorded to those subjected to
illegal investigations.
Records of covert governmental investigations present few
problems for the court confronted with an expunction request.
130. Upon request for expunction the better test for evaluation of
the government's interest in the records is admissibility as evidence,
rather than mere informational benefit. If based on this test, expunction
will likely cure any underlying illegality in the police investigation.
131. Morrow v. District of Columbia, 417 F.2d 728, 742 (D.C. Cir.
1969).
132. Id. at 741.
133. Kowall v. United States, 53 F.R.D. 211, 214-16 (W.D. Mich.
1971).
134. Bilick v. Dudley, 356 F. Supp. 945 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
135. Sullivan v. Murphy, 478 F.2d 938, 968 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
136. See, e.g., United States v. Kalish, 271 F. Supp. 968, 970 (D.P.R.
1967).
137. See generally text accompanying note 132 supra.
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There is no overriding justification for retention of the records
because no valid law enforcement purpose originally existed for
conducting the investigation.138 This conclusion would also nec-
essarily follow if the investigation was an unconstitutional inva-
sion of personal privacy. In contrast to arrest records, the citizen
is less likely to know when or where such investigatory records
will be released, thereby reducing the opportunity for the citizen
to take corrective action on his own.139 Thus, only a total ex-
punction of the records can protect the legal rights of the investi-
gated citizen and return him to the same position as that before
the investigation. Moreover, like the exclusionary rule under the
fourth amendment,14 0 total expunction not only prevents the
government from benefiting from illegally acquired records, but
it also may serve as a sanction against continued misconduct by
the government.141 Finally, expunction provides the most logical
and potentially successful remedy when dealing with covert
actions, since much of the investigatory process may be hidden
even from the courts.142
If a plaintiff fails to obtain an expunction order or does not
object to the existence of records, he should at least be able to
compel correction of inaccuracies in his records. In Tarlton v.
138. But a societal interest, the historical value of records of govern-
mental wrongdoing, must also be taken into consideration in the balanc-
ing of interests prerequisite to an expunction order. Arguably, in order
to guard against future illegal or unconstitutional actions by govern-
mental agents, society must know when and how such activities occurred
in the past. This societal interest, however, will almost always be out-
weighed by the interest of the citizen. For example, if the records con-
cern wide-spread investigations of the exercise of first amendment rights,
such as protests against the war in Vietnam, and if the citizen would
only be minimally harmed by dissemination of the records, an order pro-
hibiting dissemination would adequately protect the citizen's interests
and the societal interest in historical data would be paramount. Where
there is a strong possibility of relatively immediate harm to the citizen,
however, his interest should outweigh the societal interest, leading to
a conclusion that expunction is the appropriate remedy.
139. With an arrest record, the citizen is at least on notice that such
a record may be distributed to potential employers and others. The ex-
tent of the dissemination of records of covert investigations, however,
will seldom be known.
140. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
141. This would hold true to the extent that the government is de-
prived of information that it desires to use. In this circumstance, the
sanction may be more effective than the exclusionary rule under the
fourth amendment.
142. Of course, there is no assurance that the government agency
involved will not retain a copy of the expunged record. Thus, even judi-
cially enforceable remedies cannot be expected to be successful in all
cases.
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Saxbe,143 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that
the FBI has a continuing duty to establish the accuracy and com-
pleteness of all entries into its national arrest records system,
particularly entries relating to the disposition of any arrest and
the reasons for that disposition. A court order to correct
inaccuracies was suggested as a possible remedy to preserve the
legally protected interests of subject individuals.14 4 The appli-
cability of the Second Circuit's holding may be somewhat re-
stricted because the FBI's duty to correct its records was condi-
tioned on feasibility in terms of costs and administrative bur-
dens. 1 45  Illegal governmental investigations should stand on a
different ground, however. The right to have any inaccuracies
in the investigatory records corrected must outweigh the costs
and administrative burdens involved. If the investigated citizen
does not object to the continued existence of the records, Tarl-
ton should be read as conferring a right to correction of any in-
accuracies in the records that may prove potentially harmful. 46
C. DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS AND INJUNCTIONS
Actions in which expunction of records or damages for a
violation of constitutional rights are sought typically include
requests for declaratory and injunctive relief.1 47 The Federal
Declaratory Judgment Act provides that a federal court "may
declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested
party seeking such declaration, whether or not relief is or could
be sought.' ' 148  If standing requirements are met the Declara-
143. 507 F.2d 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1974). See FBI Has An Affirmative
Duty, supra note 112, at 1308.
144. 507 F.2d at 1129.
145. FBI Has an Affirmative Duty, supra note 112, at 1314.
146. The rationale of Tarlton should apply if the complaining citizen
can demonstrate that the inaccurate records may be distributed, either
to the public or among governmental agencies. If the citizen is proceed-
ing under the Privacy Act, however, the reasoning of Tarlton will not
apply because there are no provisions in the Privacy Act for correcting
inaccurate records maintained by an agency pursuant to the enforcement
of criminal laws. Such records are exempt from the provisions of the
Act that specify correction procedures. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j) (2) (Supp. V
1975).
147. See, e.g., Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955) (action for de-
claratory relief in which expunction was also ordered); Chastain v.
Kelley, 510 F.2d 1232 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (action for expunction and injunc-
tive relief respecting dissemination of employment records); Sullivan v.
Murphy, 478 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (action for expunction and injunc-
tion against prosecution).
148. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (1970).
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tory Judgment Act may be utilized to obtain a determination
of the legality of the government's investigation. Of course, such
a declaration will never be an essential prerequisite to granting
the particular relief sought.
Where an illegal agency investigation is involved, injunctive
relief may also be granted in addition to expunction of the rec-
ords obtained. 149 An injunction against the dissemination or fu-
ture use of investigatory records may be necessary to protect
against duplication of the records.150 Additionally, it would seem
desirable to obtain an injunction against future illegal investiga-
tions of the plaintiff.1'5
Whether a plaintiff has standing to sue is the threshold issue
that must be resolved in both declaratory judgment and injunc-
tive actions. In Laird v. Tatum, 52 the United States Supreme
Court held that the plaintiffs did not have standing to challenge
the Army's program of domestic surveillance of civilians because
they did not show that they would definitely be subjected to
surveillance or that they would personally suffer any adverse
consequences as a result of that surveillance.153 On the other
hand, the standing doctrine has not presented an obstacle to
courts in actions for declaratory judgments or injunctions regard-
149. While courts act within their equitable powers to grant the re-
lief necessary to protect the legal rights of the parties involved, there
is no federal statute generally providing for injunctive relief. Cf.
Chastain v. Kelley, 510 F.2d 1232, 1235 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
150. See note 121 supra. An injunction prohibiting use of the records
may prove to be the most effective remedy, since it is of indefinite dura-
tion and is enforceable through the contempt powers of the court. Yet
an injunction against future governmental use of investigatory records
may amount to a judicial prohibition against prosecution. Such a pro-
hibitory injunction would contradict the doctrine that equity will not en-
join a prosecution. Theoretically, this problem would not exist if the
subject matter of the investigatory records is protected under the first
amendment.
151. See note 150 supra.
152. 408 U.S. 1 (1971). See notes 26-27 supra and accompanying
text..
153. Similarly, in United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75
(1947), the Court found that a claimed violation of the first amendment
by the Hatch Act was not justiciable. Postal workers challenged the
application of the Act, which prohibits federal employees from engaging
in political campaign activities, but they had not yet acted nor had the
Justice Department indicated what types of actions it would treat as vio-
lations of the Act. The Supreme Court held that there was no "case
or controversy" as required by Article III of the Constitution and dis-
missed the action. Mitchell can also be read as dealing with the standing
issue, since the plaintiffs had not alleged the sort of injury necessary
to meet Article flI requirements.
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ing arrest records.' 54 Since arrest records remain in the posses-
sion of the government, which has the ability to distribute or
use them, courts have concluded that a great risk of harm
through adverse disclosure exists.' 55 These courts typically base
standing on facts implying that a definite injury may occur if
no judicial action is taken. 156
A different test for standing is required in cases involving
records compiled in the course of illegal governmental actions,
such as investigations of activities protected by the first amend-
ment. The citizen faces greater difficulties in proving that
adverse consequences will result from retention of such records.
Since there is no systematic process of retention and dissemina-
tion, as with arrest records, it is almost impossible to ascertain
a precise risk of harm to the plaintiff from covert government
conduct. The constitutional "case or controversy" requirement
can be met, however, by the adversarial positions of the two par-
ties and the intention of the government to retain the records of
the illegal investigation. 57 To deny adjudication until actual
social or economic harm has occurred would serve no useful pur-
pose and place too great a burden on the plaintiff. Hence, the
proper approach would be to liberally grant standing to plain-
tiff's seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, especially if a con-
stitutional right to privacy is recognized. 58
D. AcTIONS FOR DAMAGES
Compensatory relief may be obtained when the government's
investigation of the exercise of first amendment rights results
The general requirements for standing have also been defined as the
constitutional necessity that the plaintiff show an "exercise of govern-
mental power [that is] regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory in nature,
and that the complainant [is] either presently or prospectively subject
to the regulations, proscriptions, or compulsions that he is challenging."
Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 11 (1971).
154. See Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017, 1023 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Sul-
livan v. Murphy, 478 F.2d 338 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 880
(1973).
155. See, e.g., Morrow v. District of Columbia, 417 F.2d 728, 741 (D.C.
Cir. 1969).
156. Id.
157. Article III requirements could be met by such a showing if the
constitutional right to privacy is considered the controlling doctrine. See
note 65 and accompanying text, supra. Otherwise, under the present in-
terpretation of the first amendment, a more definite harm would have
to be shown. See text accompanying note 26 supra.
158. Since the constitutional right to privacy functions more as a lim-
itation on governmental actions than as a right of autonomy, declaratory
judgments should be encouraged by such liberal standing requirements.
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in actual harm. The appropriate basis for such relief is the con-
stitutional tort theory established by the Supreme Court in
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau
of Narcotics.'" In an action to recover damages for injuries
sustained during an arrest and search conducted by federal
agents in violation of fourth amendment rights, the Court held
that the plaintiff could recover for such injuries because it was
"'well settled that where legal rights have been invaded, . ..
federal courts may use any available remedy to make good the
wrong done.'"160 Although Bivens dealt exclusively with the
fourth amendment, its reasoning has also been applied to the
fifth amendment'0 ' and the first amendment.0 2  Under Bivens,
a plaintiff can recover monetary damages in a federal tort action
"if he can demonstrate an injury consequent upon the violation
by federal agents of his [constitutional] rights."'163
Recovery of damages for investigations of first amendment
exercises is beginning to emerge as an issue in the federal courts.
Recently, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Paton v. La
Prade'64 held that public disclosure of the fact and substance
of an FBI investigation may present a cause of action for damages
under the first amendment. The difficulty with damage claims
under the first amendment lies in defining what constitutes an
injury to first amendment rights. To date no federal court has
granted damages for a "chilling effect" on the exercise of first
amendment rights. There is, however, no reason why damages
could not be recovered if the plaintiff "does not speak or act as
he says he wants to,"' 6 5 and is thereby harmed in some tangible
manner. The claim would proceed under a theory of loss of op-
portunity, seeking compensation for losses occasioned by the non-
exercise of a first amendment right.1 6
159. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
160. Id. at 396, citing Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946).
161. United States ex rel. Moore v. Koelzer, 457 F.2d 892 (3d Cir.
1972).
162. Paton v. LaPrade, 524 F.2d 862 (3d Cir. 1975). See Smith v.
Losee, 485 F.2d 334 (10th Cir. 1973); note 4 supra.
163. 403 U.S. at 397. It should be noted, however, that damage ac-
tions under Bivens and the Civil Rights statutes, such as 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
have rarely been successful.
164. 524 F.2d 862 (3d Cir. 1975).
165. National Student Assoc. v. Hershey, 412 F.2d 1103, 1111 (D.C.
Cir. 1969).
166. This theory should not be a strict analogy to contract law, how-
ever. Rather, the concept employed should be the actual loss suffered
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The Supreme Court's recognition in NAACP v. Alabama 16 7
that the danger involved in some violations of first amendment
rights is the combination of state and private action indicates
that a cause of action will be recognized where state and private
action coalesce to damage the plaintiff. Thus, if an illegal gov-
ernmental investigation is disclosed to a potential employer, dam-
ages would lie for any loss of job opportunity caused by the dis-
closure. On the other hand, if all that is shown is an agency
investigation based on an impermissible motive, then no damage
action would lie because there has been no proof of actual injury
to the citizen. Speculation as to possible future consequences
may suffice to establish standing to sue, 168 but such speculation
is insufficient to establish a right to damages.
If the courts further develop and accept the constitutional
right to privacy doctrine, the theory of damages recoverable for
violation of that right will be the same as that for violations of
first amendment rights.6 9 Even though it can be persuasively
argued that amassing investigatory records on certain protected
matters violates constitutional rights, that conclusion itself pre-
sents only a basis .for granting equitable relief. In order for a
damage action to be successful, there must be an actual injury
resulting from the violation of the right to privacy. The same
reasoning applies to violations of rights conferred by statutes.'7 0
Next, it is necessary to consider the defense of official
immunity, which will almost always be raised by the federal offi-
cers who are sued. After Bivens, the federal courts were
confronted with the problem of defining defenses to the new tort
due to the fact that the citizen was prevented from acting in the consti-
tutionally protected manner.
Reliance on a contractual theory for recovery of damages would
raise the question whether the citizen has a duty to mitigate any possible
damages by acting despite the government's threat. Although no court
has dealt with this question (perhaps because it appears inconsistent
with the psychological theory behind the "chilling effect" doctrine) there
may be some benefit to requiring citizens to mitigate damages in first
amendment cases by speaking or acting in spite of illegal government
conduct. Probably the most significant benefit to be derived from such
an approach is that the citizen's challenge may induce the government
to refrain from further threats, or where the government proceeds with
its threatened action, the issues presented by the citizen's first amend-
ment claim will be more directly confronted than through a request for
expunction or damages. Cf. Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307
(1967).
167. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
168. See text accompanying notes 155-156 supra.
169. In both instances, damages can be measured only in terms of
the consequences of the government's unconstitutional action.
170. See text accompanying note 178 infra.
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action. 171 Because the defendants in such cases are agents of
the executive branch, the issue of official immunity arises. Offi-
cial immunity may be invoked when two elements co-exist: the
federal agent must be acting within the scope of his authority
and the act must be of a discretionary nature.172 The latter
element has also been described as a requirement that the fed-
eral officer act in good faith and on the basis of probable cause
that an offense has been committed. 178 Unless these elements
of official immunity are established, the officer or agent will be
held personally liable if the alleged tort is proved. Although
official immunity may apply in some cases of illegal govern-
mental investigations, the defense presents no difficulties
where an agent knowingly violates a particular constitutional
guarantee.17 4
Although it is unlikely that most covert governmental
investigations will result in judicial awards of both equitable and
compensatory relief, recovery of damages nonetheless remains an
important remedy. To effectuate such relief, courts must apply
the Bivens analysis, examining the consequences of the viola-
tion of civil rights rather than limiting damages to the direct
frustration of the right itself.175 By such an approach, the
courts can fully protect constitutional rights by compensat-
ing not only the violation of the right but also the secondary
injuries that would not have occurred but for the initial violation
of the constitutional right at issue. Certainly, this theory of
171. On remand from the Supreme Court, the Second Circuit in
Bivens held that the immunity concepts developed from past cases deal-
ing with suits against federal officers should be available to the defend-
ants. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, 456 F.2d 1339, 1343 (2d Cir. 1972).
172. Id. at 1343.
173. Id. at 1347.
174. Because the Privacy Act of 1974 generally prohibits investiga-
tions of the exercise of first amendment rights, see text accompanying
note 90 supra, the good faith immunity defense will not be readily avail-
able to federal officers. Rather, if a citizen can show that the govern-
ment's investigation was occasioned by a violation of his protected
rights, there prima facie will be a lack of good faith and probable cause.
Difficult questions of immunity arise only when the actions of federal
officers were discretionary in nature and there was a genuine question
as to whether the citizen was engaging in protected conduct. See Paton
v. LaPrade, 524 F.2d 862, 872 (3d Cir. 1975).
175. Since injuries sustained in violation of the first amendment will
never be direct, analogous to the intrusion upon property occurring dur-
ing a search violative of the fourth amendment, damages must always be
measured through the Bivens method of an "injury consequent upon the
violation . . . of [constitutional] rights." See text accompanying note
163 supra.
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damages must still be conditioned upon a showing of actual in-
jury and a further showing that the injury was a direct conse-
quence of the government's illegal action. But to otherwise re-
strict the damages remedy would be to fail to fully recognize
the scope of constitutional or statutory rights.
The Privacy Act of 1974 also contains a damages remedy that
could be applied to governmental maintenance of records con-
cerning the exercise of first amendment rights.176 The govern-
ment directly violates section (e) (7) of the Act if it maintains
such records.177 Damages may be sought for violation of any
provision of .the Act for which there is no specific civil remedy
whenever a district court determines that "the agency acted in
a manner which was intentional or willful."'"78 The plaintiff
must show that the government knowingly compiled the rec-
ords, a fact often established by the records themselves.179 If
liability is found, the United States is obliged to pay only if
"actual damages [are] sustained by the individual as a result...
but in no case shall a person entitled to recovery receive less
than the sum of $1000," and the cost of litigation and attorney's
fees.8 0 Although there may be some question as to whether
the term "actual damages" simply refers to a violation of section
(e) (7) or another comparable section, the statutory language
appears to cover only injuries other than simple maintenance of
the records. Thus, an "actual injury" is an injury sustained as
a consequence of dissemination of the records. The Privacy Act
would be considerably more effective if amended to provide a
right to expunction and injunction where files are compiled and
maintained in violation of section (e) (7).
IV. CONCLUSION
Although governmental investigations of the exercise of first
amendment rights by American citizens are not a new phenome-
non, the increasing public awareness of investigations conducted
during the past decade will probably lead to a greater number
of citizen suits.
Increased public concern, if expressed through litigation, will
in turn force the judiciary to face some of the difficult issues
176. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g) (1) (Supp. V 1975).
177. See text accompanying note 84 supra.
178. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g) (1) (D) (Supp. V 1975).
179. This requirement is necessary to distinguish the case in which
the complaining citizen is named in otherwise properly compiled records
concerning another individual's activities.
180. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g) (4) (A) (Supp. V 1975).
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discussed in this Note. Existing legal doctrines will need to be
adapted or new doctrines developed to meet the peculiar diffi-
culties of providing effective remedies for citizens injured by
covert government action.
Congress can contribute significantly towards solving these
problems. First, it could place strict limits upon investigations
not conducted to enforce valid statutory provisions. Second,
statutes could be passed expressly providing for expunction of
illegally obtained records and the recovery of minimum damages.
Creative action by both the judicial and legislative branches must
be forthcoming in order to ensure effective protection of the first
amendment rights of American citizens.
